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THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN
TAXING ITS NONRESIDENT CITIZENS
RICHARD D. PoMP*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a less developed country should tax the income
of its citizens who reside abroad has been the subject of at
least four international conferences since 1975.' This atten-
tion is attributable to Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of Colum-
bia University, who has written extensively about the "brain
drain": the large-scale movement of skilled labor from less
developed countries (hereinafter LDCs) to developed coun-
tries (hereinafter DCs). 2 Professor Bhagwati has proposed a
* J.D. 1972, Harvard University: Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School;
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. The author greatly apprcci-
ates the insights offered by Professors MichaelJ. McIntyre and Oliver Old-
man upon their reading of an earlier draft of this Article. This Article
revises a study prepared for the World Bank. The opinions expressed
herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the World Bank or of
its affiliates.
1. These conferences include: Brain Drain and Income Taxation,
Bellagio, Italy (Feb. 15-19, 1975); United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) Group of Governmental Experts on Re-
verse Transfer of Technology, Geneva, Switzerland (Feb. 27-Mar. 7,
1978); Fifth Session of UNCTAD, Manila, Philippines (May 7-June 2,
1979); Extending Income TaxJurisdiction over Citizens Working Abroad,
New Delhi, India (Jan. 12-15, 1981).
2. Skilled workers also migrate among DCs. Indeed, the term "brain
drain" apparently made its contemporary debut in a 1962 report by the
British Royal Society concerning the emigration of scientists and engi-
neers from Britain to North America. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., BRAN
DRAIN: A STUDY OF THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL SCIEN'IFIC
MOBILITY 1057 (Comm. Print 1974). Migration also occurs among LDCs;
for example, many Filipinos work in the Middle East. UNCTAD, Case
Studies in Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain); A Survey of
Problems and Policies in the Philippines, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/5, at
iv (1977) [hereinafter cited as Case Studies in Reverse Transfer]. Many
countries also experience an internal brain drain when persons migrate
from a country's less developed rural areas to its relatively more dcvel-
oped urban areas. See i& As the tide of the UNCTAD document suggests,
the United Nations prefers the term "reverse transfer of technology" to
245
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tax to transfer revenue to LDCs that experience a brain
drain.3 The Bhagwati proposal has generated considerable
controversy because the brain drain raises fundamental
moral and political questions about a citizen's right to self-
realization and fulfillment. 4 The controversy is also fueled
by a lack of consensus on the causes and effects of the brain
drain. 5
Initially, three versions of the Bhagwati proposal were
discussed: a tax levied by the United Nations, a tax levied by
the country of immigration (the host DC), and a tax levied by
the country of emigration (the LDC). An income tax levied
by an LDC on its nonresident citizens emerged from interna-
tional discussion as the most feasible version. 6 This form of
the Bhagwati proposal is attractive because any LDC can
the term "brain drain." The former is thought to be more neutral in con-
notation because it does not prejudge the issue of whether the emigration
of skilled labor is, in fact, harmful to the LDCs. For stylistic convenience
only, the term "brain drain" is used in this Article.
The terms "developed countries" and "less developed countries"
have no precise definitions and for purposes of this Article it is unneces-
sary that any be formulated. See generally Pomp & Oldman, Tax Measures in
Response to the Brain Drain, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (1979).
3. See Bhagwati, The United States in the Nixon Era: The End of Innocence,
101 DAEDALUS 25, 41-44 (1972). Bhagwati's proposal was first discussed
at a conference entitled Brain Drain and Income Taxation held in 1975.
See supra note 1. Some of the papers presented at that conference were
published in volume three of WORLD DEVELOPMENT and volume two of the
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL ECONOMIcs. Additionally, papers were re-
printed in TAXING THE BRAIN DRAIN I: A PROPOSAL U. Bhagwati & M. Part-
ington eds. 1976) and THE BRAIN DRAIN AND TAXATION II: THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (J. Bhagwati ed. 1976). The Bhagwati proposal was
also debated at UNCTAD's 1978 and 1979 meetings. See UNCTAD, Re-
verse Transfer of Technology: A Survey of its Main Features, Causes and
Policy Implications, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/47 (1979); UNCTAD, Technol-
ogy: Development Aspects of the Reverse Transfer of Technology, U.N.
Doc. TD/239 (1979). In 1981, Bhagwati's proposal was the centerpiece of
a conference in New Delhi, India. See supra note 1. The proceedings of
this conference will be published in INCOME TAXATION IN THE PRESENCE OF
INTERNA'IONAL PERSONAL MOBILITY (J. Wilson & J. Bhagwati eds. forth-
coming 1986).
4. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 13-15.
5. See id. at 15-16.
6. This version of the tax was first proposed in Pomp & Oldman, The
Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal, 3 WORLD DEv. 751,754-
60 (1975).
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adopt it unilaterally.7 Moreover, precedent for taxing citi-
zens and emigrants abroad already exists. For a number of
years, the United States,8 the Philippines,9 and, until re-
cently, Mexico' have levied an income tax on the worldwide
income of their citizens, both resident and nonresident.
None of these countries, however, adopted this broad asser-
tion of jurisdiction in response to the brain drain.
In contrast to the United States and the Philippines,
most countries view citizenship as irrelevant for tax pur-
poses. In these countries, residency is the relevant jurisdic-
tional nexus.'1 In other words, residents are taxable on their
worldwide income, but nonresidents are not taxable on their
income from abroad even if they are citizens of the taxing
country.' 2 Although definitions of "resident" vary among
countries, and may include persons temporarily living and
working abroad, persons who have emigrated-the group
most likely to constitute the brain drain--do not fall within
any of the traditional definitions.' 3 An LDC that relies on
residency jurisdiction is therefore unlikely to tax the income
earned abroad by its emigrant citizens.
An LDC that desired to implement the Bhagwati propo-
sal could follow the precedent of the United States, the Phil-
7. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 25-44.
8. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 1, 68A
Stat. 5-7 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.) § 1 (1982)); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (1956).
9. See infra Section II.
10. EffectiveJanuary 1, 1981, Mexico ceased taxing the worldwide in-
come of its nonresident citizens. See Massone, The Mexican Income Tax, 35
BuLL. FOR INT'L FIsCAL Doc. 389 (1981).
11. Countries that assert citizenship jurisdiction rely on residency for
taxing noncitizens. In other words, either citizenship or residence status is
sufficient for taxation. Resident noncitizens are taxable on their world-
wide income in the same manner as resident citizens. Once thejurisdic-
tional nexus of residency has been severed, however, nonresident
noncitizens will no longer be taxed on their income from abroad, whereas
nonresident citizens will continue to be taxed on their worldwide income.
Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 28-33.
12. Nonresidents will remain taxable on income received from within
the taxing country. Id. at 28-33. In a minority of countries, the source of
income is the only jurisdictional nexus relied upon. These countries tax
income from domestic sources regardless of the taxpayer's status; income
from foreign sources is exempt. I1 at 28-29.
13. I& at 30.
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ippines, and Mexico and assert jurisdiction on the basis of
citizenship.' 4 Before adopting such an approach, however,
an LDC would have to be confident that it could administer
this broad assertion of tax jurisdiction effectively.
Problems that an LDC might encounter in implement-
ing a tax on nonresident citizens have been predicted in the
theoretical literature. 15 Empirical evidence does not exist,
however, to indicate whether these administrative problems
would actually materialize. Neither the Philippine nor the
Mexican experience in enforcing a tax on nonresidents has
been studied before. Although information on the U.S. ex-
perience is available, it is of limited value' 6 and not helpful in
14. Alternatively, an LDC could adopt an idiosyncratic definition of
residence, one that relies heavily on a person's prior contacts with the
country. Because this approach would deviate from international practice
and custom, it could undermine the acceptability of the tax. Id. at 31.
15. Id. at 39-43.
16. At the New Delhi conference, see supra note 1, Gary Hufbauer, a
former U.S. Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade
and Investment Policy, reported that the United States was generally suc-
cessful in administering citizenshipjurisdiction. He emphasized, however,
that the United States has typically provided generous exemptions for in-
come earned abroad, which have mitigated its administrative problems by
reducing the number of nonresidents subject to the income tax. For ex-
ample, from 1926 to 1953, U.S. citizens abroad generally could exclude
from U.S. taxable income all of their foreign earned income. From 1952
to 1976, a ceiling was placed on the exemption. From 1978 to 1981, the
exemption was eliminated for many persons and was replaced with a sys-
tem of special deductions to adjust for certain living expenses abroad.
Starting in 1982, the United States reinstituted the exemption. Field &
Greeg, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Earned Income of Private Employees, in ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 99 (1976). See also I.R.C. § 911, 913 (1976),
amended by I.R.C. § 911 (1982).
More recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a
study of nonresident U.S. taxpayers. The GAO estimated that 61 percent
of its sample of nonresident citizens did not file a U.S. tax return. Because
of the limited data available to the GAO, however, this figure may be seri-
ously overstated. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) believes too that
many U.S. citizens abroad are not filing income tax returns. J. Finch,
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Mone-
tary Affairs on United States Citizens Living in Foreign Countries and Not
Filing Federal Income Tax Returns 2-4 (May 8, 1985) (unpublished state-
ment available in files of NYUJ. Int'l L. & Pol.) (hereinafter cited as Finch
Statement). The Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations will publish
hearings including the Finch Statement in Fall 1985.
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predicting the problems that an LDC might encounter.17
Without information about the administrative feasibility
of an LDC tax, international discussion of the Bhagwati pro-
posal has reached an impasse. Debate continues over the
fairness, political, and human rights issues posed by such a
tax, but these issues are neither easily resolved nor suscepti-
ble to empirical inquiry.' 8 Moreover, the debate will be
moot if the administrative difficulties of implementing an
LDC tax prove insurmountable.
In order to gain some insight into the administrative as-
pects of the Bhagwati proposal, the World Bank commis-
sioned the author to conduct a case study of the Philippine
taxation of nonresident citizens. By documenting the Philip-
pine experience, the World Bank hoped better to predict
problems that other LDCs might encounter in implementing
a tax on nonresident citizens. This case study provides the
focus for this Article.
Section II describes the experiences of the Philippines in
taxing its nonresident citizens during three time periods:
before 1970, 1970-1972, and 1973 to the present. In each
period, the Philippines tried a different approach to the taxa-
tion of nonresident citizens.
Analysis of these three approaches illuminates two gen-
eral sets of problems. The first involves the question
whether an LDC should tax nonresidents in the same man-
ner as residents or use special rules. Prior to 1970, the Phil-
ippines taxed resident and nonresident citizens identically;
since that time, however, it has applied special rules to non-
17. Most LDCs are less sophisticated than the United States in en-
forcing their tax systems. See generally READINGs ON INCOME TAX ADMINIS-
TRATION (P. Kelley & 0. Oldman eds. 1973). The inefficiency of LDCs in
administering their taxes domestically suggests that attempts at asserting
jurisdiction over nonresidents may pose difficult administrative problems.
Moreover, LDCs may face the additional problem that many of their non-
resident citizens may be emigrants who intend to become citizens of their
host DCs. Emigrants may feel little pressure to comply with an LDC tax,
especially if they do not anticipate returning to their LDCs. The United
States is not faced with this problem on a large scale; commonly, its citi-
zens working outside the country alternate periods abroad with periods
within the United States. The awareness of taxpayers abroad that they will
eventually return home is likely to offset any inclination to ignore their tax
obligations.
18. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 3-4 nn.8-9.
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residents.' 9
The second set of problems centers around the adminis-
trative difficulties of imposing a tax on persons abroad. The
Philippines appears to have been markedly unsuccessful in
enforcing its tax on emigrants. Noncompliapce among this
group is apparently widespread, and the Philippines lacks
any effective response or sanctions.
Section III analyzes the implications of these problems
for the Bhagwati proposal. That section proposes a possible
resolution to the structural problem of designing an LDC tax
suitable for nonresidents. The administrative problems of
the Bhagwati proposal, by comparison, are less easily re-
solved. To enforce the tax equitably for all nonresidents, an
LDC will need the cooperation of each host DC. The neces-
sity of obtaining DC cooperation, however, undercuts one of
the attractive features of an LDC tax-that it can be adopted
unilaterally by an LDC.
Section IV poses the dilemma that Professor Bhagwati
and his supporters face. If they are unable to convince the
DCs to cooperate in policing an LDC tax on nonresidents,
the tax will fall disproportionately on transient nonresidents.
Because most of the transient nonresidents are unskilled
workers, the LDCs would inevitably tax the "muscle drain"
rather than the brain drain.
II. THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE WITH THE TAXATION OF
NONRESIDENT CITIZENS
A. Before 1970
The early Philippine reliance on citizenship as a basis for
tax jurisdiction reflects more the country's colonial legacy
from the United States than a carefully developed policy. In-
itially, Philippine citizens were taxed under the U.S. Revenue
Act of 1913.20 This Act, adopted shortly after ratification of
19. See Philippines Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memoran-
dum Circular No. 40-71, § I (hereinafter cited as Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue, Mem. Cir. No. 40-71).
20. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat, 166
(1913). Internal revenue officers of the Philippine government adminis-
tered the Revenue Act of 1913 within the Philippines. The revenue col-
lected accrued to the Philippines and not to the United States. Id. § II(M).
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the sixteenth amendment in the United States, 21 taxed the
worldwide income of U.S. and Philippine citizens, regardless
of where they lived.22
In 1918, the United States authorized the Philippines to
adopt its own tax code.23 Pursuant to this power and with-
out extensive discussion or debate, the Philippines adopted a
tax code based substantially upon then-existing U.S. tax
law,24 and taxed all citizens identically, regardless of their
residence. Thus, early in its history, the Philippines incorpo-
rated citizenship jurisdiction into its own law following the
U.S. model.
The Philippines taxed all citizens uniformly, regardless
of residence until 1970. Their worldwide net incomes were
subject to progressive rates that started at 5%b on net in-
comes of up to 2,000 pesos and reached 70 on net incomes
exceeding 500,000 pesos.25
Philippine citizens could either deduct any income taxes
paid to a foreign country from gross income or credit those
taxes against their Philippine income tax.2 6 This option was
intended to mitigate the burden of multiple taxation which
can result when a taxpayer or his or her income is subject to
the tax jurisdiction of more than one country. For example,
both the United States and the Philippines could tax Philip-
pine citizens working in the United States. 27 These taxpay-
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without ap-
portionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration.").
22. Citizenship jurisdiction was adopted by the United States without
any debate or discussion of alternatives and the Philippines hardly can be
faulted for doing likewise. According to Professor Surrey, the U.S. deci-
sion was "apparently automatically made, without discussion, and appar-
ently as an intuitive matter." Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of
Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 817 (1956).
23. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 261, 40 Stat. 1087-88
(1919).
24. See I. EVANGELISTA, PHILIPPINE INCOME TAX LAW 1 (1961).
25. See Philippines National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §§ 21,
22, Comm. Act No. 466.
26. Ide § 30(c)(1)(B). Presumably, this provision was modeled after a
similar one in the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 904 1954 & Supp.
1985; see also Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 5(a)(3), 39 Stat.
759 (1916).
27. If the United States government were to consider these Filipinos
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ers would presumably choose to credit their U.S. taxes
against their Philippine taxes rather than to deduct their U.S.
taxes from gross income. A credit would produce a peso-for-
peso offset against their Philippine taxes, whereas the benefit
of a deduction would be limited to the product of their Phil-
ippine tax rates and the peso equivalent of their U.S. taxes.
Three sets of problems emerged from this pattern of
taxation. The first arose around 1970, when the peso floated
and the exchange rate of thepeso to the U.S. dollar increased
dramatically from 2:1 to 7.5:1.28 Because of the devaluation,
even modest foreign salaries made nonresident Philippine
citizens living in the United States appear wealthy by Philip-
pine standards. Consequently, many nonresidents were
thrust into the highest tax brackets of the progressive Philip-
pine rate schedule.
For example, at a 2:1 exchange rate, the Philippine 70%o
marginal tax rate was applicable to incomes of $250,000
(500,000 pesos divided by 2) or more. At a 7.5:1 exchange
rate, however, the highest tax rate was reached at incomes of
$66,667 (500,000 pesos divided by 7.5). The effect of the de-
valuation was that Filipinos working in the United States
were viewed for tax purposes as having incomes in pesos 3.75
times (7.5 divided by 2) larger than before. They conse-
as residents for tax purposes, it would tax their worldwide income. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (1984). Otherwise, it would tax them only on in-
come from U.S. sources. See I.R.C. § 871 (1982).
Multiple taxation often arises because one country taxes individuals
on the basis of residency or citizenship, and the other taxes them on the
basis of the source of their income. International law has never required a
country to provide relief from multiple taxation, although most countries
that tax foreign income normally grant some relief by providing either a
deduction or a credit for foreign taxes. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2,
at 36-37.
28. Discussions with officials of the Central Bank in Manila (July,
1980). In conducting research for this Article the author interviewed nu-
merous officials at all levels, with the understanding that comments and
statements would not be attributed to specific individuals. Officials were
extremely cooperative and provided complete access to the existing data.
Unfortunately, numerous weaknesses and gaps in the data make rigorous
analysis and inquiry difficult. Consequently, some of the observations in
this Article are based on the impressions of experienced and candid Phil-
ippine officials. The views of these officials, which were neither self-serv-
ing, uncritical, nor defensive, are consistent with the limited empirical
data. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
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quently experienced a sharp increase in their tax burdens,
even though in dollars their incomes had not changed.29 It
is not surprising that many nonresident Filipinos complained
to their government about inequitable Philippine tax bur-
dens and questioned the propriety of being subject to the
29. For another example, consider a Filipino couple residing in the
United States with $8,000 of taxable income. Assuming that ajoint return
was filed, the couple paid $1,380 in U.S. taxes for 1970. For a table of
1970 tax liabilities, see W. ANDREWS, BAsic FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
793 (2d ed. 1979). Assume for simplicity that the couple's taxable income
under Philippine law was also $8,000. At a conversion rate of 2 pesos to 1
U. S. dollar, the couple had a taxable income of 16,000 pesos. Their Philip-
pine tax liability, prior to a credit for their U.S. tax, would be 1,960 pesos
($980). For the 1970 Philippine tax rates, see JOINT LEGISLATivE-ExECU-
TIvE TAX COMMISSION, A SHORT GUIDE TO PHILIPPINE TAXES REViSED
(1970). The credit for their U.S. tax of $1,380 completely eliminated their
Philippine tax of $980. Consequently, at a conversion rate of 2:1 this
couple did not owe a Philippine tax. The overall effective tax rate on this
couple was 17.3% ($1,380 divided by $8,000) and was determined solely
by the U.S. tax rate.
After devaluation of thepeso, this couple had taxable income of 60,000
pesos ($8,000 times 7.5), see supra text accompanying note 28, and a Philip-
pine tax liability of 18,360 pesos ($2,448). The credit for their U.S. tax of
$1,380 reduced their Philippine tax to $1,068 ($2,448 minus $1,380). The
overall effective tax rate on this couple was 30.6% ($2,448 divided by
$8,000) and their total taxes, U.S. and Philippine, increased from $1,380
to $2,448, an increase of 77%.
The devaluation more dramatically affected a couple having an in-
come of $20,000. Their U.S. tax in 1970 was $4,380. Prior to devaluation,
their Philippine taxable income was 40,000 pesos, generating a pre-credit
Philippine tax liability of 9,480 pesos ($4,740). After credit for their U.S.
tax, the couple paid tax at an overall effective tax rate of 23.7% ($4,740
divided by $20,000). After devaluation, the couple had a taxable income
of 150,000 pesos (20,000 times 7.5) and a pre-credit Philippine tax liability
of 69,640 pesos ($9,285). The credit for their U.S. tax of $4,380 reduced
their Philippine tax to $4,905 ($9,285 minus $4,380). Their overall effec-
tive tax rate after the devaluation was 46.4% ($9,285 divided by $20,000).
Their total taxes, U.S. and Philippine, increased about 96%0 from $4,740
to $9,285.
As these examples demonstrate, the effective tax rate for nonresident
taxpayers was determined by the higher of the U.S. (or other DC) effective
tax rate or the Philippine effective tax rate. Even though salaries in the
United States were generally higher than those in the Philippines, the in-
teraction of the fixed exchange rate of 2:1 and the respective rate struc-
tures of the United States and the Philippines did not necessarily generate
a Philippine effective tax rate that exceeded the U. S. effective tax rate. At
an exchange rate of 7.5:1, however, the Philippine effective tax rate for
most taxpayers would exceed that of the United States.
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same rate schedule that applied to residents.3 0
A second set of problems involved the determination of
net income. Some nonresidents complained that Philippine
tax law was unduly restrictive and therefore ill-suited to cope
with conditions and practices abroad. They argued that the
Philippine tax law did not allow deductions for certain types
of expenditures incurred abroad.31 Some of those expendi-
tures were evidently allowed as deductions by the tax laws of
the host DCs, which suggested to nonresidents that Philip-
pine tax law was too harsh.
The third and most severe set of problems centered
around the administration of the Philippine tax. Measures
that facilitated the administration of the income tax at home,
such as the use of withholding, information returns, audits,
the seizure and sale of assets, garnishment, and civil and
criminal fines and penalties3 2 were unavailable or ineffective
abroad because the taxpayers, their assets, and the payors of
their incomes were outside the jurisdiction of the Philip-
pines. The national boundary was a formidable impediment
to the enforcement of a tax on nonresident citizens.33
30. Filipinos living in the United States were well organized, which
enabled them to voice their complaints effectively. Discussions with offi-
cials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (hereinafter the BIR) in Manila
(July, 1980).
31. Id. This argument evidently had two facets. The first was that
the Philippine tax code allowed certain deductions only if the expenditure
was paid or incurred in the Philippines. For example, medical expenses
and high school tuition payments for a taxpayer's dependents were de-
ductible, subject to certain ceilings, only if incurred and paid in the Philip-
pines. See Philippines National Internal Revenue Code § 30(a)(2)(A) &
(B).
The second facet was directed at the BIR's interpretation of the statu-
tory requirement that deductible expenses be "ordinary and necessary."
Id. § 30(a)(1). Some nonresidents complained that the BIR was too inflex-
ible in its interpretation of the statute. They stated that the BIR denied
deductions for expenditures that were commonplace abroad because they
were uncommon within the Philippines. In some cases, the BIR placed a
ceiling on the amount of the deduction. This ceiling was based on what
would have been reasonable had the expenditure been incurred in the
Philippines, notwithstanding that the amount of the expenditure was rea-
sonable under the standards of the DC where it actually was incurred.
32. For a discussion of these measures, see generally Oldman, Con-
trolling Income Tax Evasion, in READINGS ON INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 17, at 485-510.
33. See generally Surr, Intertax: Intergovernmental Cooperation in Taxation,
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Three obstacles confronted the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue (hereinafter the BIR).34 First, many nonresident ciri-
zens failed to file a return. The Bureau did not have a master
taxpayer roll that listed all nonresident citizens and thus
could not determine the identities of those nonresidents who
did not file.35 Compiling an accurate master list would have
been difficult, however, because detailed records of
emigrants were not kept until recently.3 6 Moreover,
although these emigrant records specify the country of initial
destination, they do not provide current addresses.3 7 With-
out such addresses, the BIR would have had difficulty con-
tacting those nonresidents whom it identified as nonfilers.
In addition, the prolonged and expensive effort involved
in determining a nonfiler's current address would not neces-
sarily be productive, because the absence of a tax return
might be due to such causes as death, marriage, change .of
citizenship, unemployment, retirement, or receipt of nontax-
able income. For these reasons, the BIR still has not at-
tempted to generate a master roll of nonresident
taxpayers.38
Second, the BIR had difficulty verifying the information
contained in those returns of nonresidents which were
filed.3 9 The BIR did not have powers, beyond those held by
private citizens, to conduct an investigation or an audit in a
foreign country. As a result, the BIR generally relied on cor-
7 HARv. INT'L L.J. (1966). Although the Surr article was written in 1966,
it generally still reflects current practices.
34. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
35. The United States also lacks a taxpayer roll of nonresident citi-
zens. See Finch Statement, supra note 16, at 5-6. The creation of a master
taxpayer roll is essential for an efficient tax administration. See Lemus,
Establishment and Maintenance of a Register of Taxpayers, in READINGS ON IN-
COME TAx ADMINISTRAION, supra note 17, at 16. "The identification and
register of taxpayers is absolutely essential for an efficient tax administra-
tion, and it might well be said that it constitutes one of the basic programs
of highest priority, without which the other programs will lack assurance
and effectiveness." Id.
36. Discussion with officials of the Ministry of Labor in Manila (July,
1980).
37. Id
38. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila Uuly, 1980).
39. Id
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respondence to verify information. 40
Audits by correspondence proved unsatisfactory, how-
ever.4 1 The normal delays in the mail between the Philip-
pines and the host DCs made these audits time-consuming.
The problem was exacerbated by the ability of nonresidents
to drag out these audits interminably, either by design or
otherwise. They would ask for clarifications of BIR ques-
tions, raise diversionary issues, and request extensions of
time in order to gather requested information. 42
Even if the information was eventually supplied, the BIR
often had trouble determining its authenticity. For example,
nonresidents would sometimes be required to submit a copy
of their DC tax returns so that the BIR could check the Phil-
ippine tax returns for consistency. The BIR suspects that
some of the copies it received were bogus foreign tax returns
specifically prepared for purposes of the audit.4 3 Moreover,
40. Rarely do tax administrators from one country conduct their own
investigation in another country. See Surr, supra note 33, at 182. Occa-
sionally, in cases involving potentially large sums of money, the BIR at-
tempted to conduct audits at a consulate in the host DC. Taxpayers could,
however, ignore requests to bring their books and accounts to the consu-
late and the BIR was powerless to deal with this recalcitrance. Further-
more, consulates were not always located near the taxpayer. Thus, the
problem of enforcement from a distance still remained. The BIR did have
leverage over nonresident citizens, however, because it had the power to
deny recalcitrant taxpayers the benefit of assistance from the consulate
should they need help in the future. Discussions with officials of the BIR
in Manila (July, 1980).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Until mentioned by the author, some BIR officials were unaware
of a procedure in the United States whereby taxpayers may obtain certified
copies of their tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service. See I.R.C.
§ 6103(p)(2)(A) (1982); Rev. Proc. 66-3, 1966-1 C.B. 601-06. Requiring
taxpayers to submit a certified copy would reduce the BIR's problem of
receiving copies of bogus U.S. returns. Appropriate safeguards would be
necessary, however, to ensure that taxpayers would submit new certified
copies every time they were to amend their U.S. returns. Otherwise, non-
residents could file U.S. tax returns that were specially prepared to mis-
lead the BIR, obtain certified copies, and then file amended U.S. returns
that corrected their early returns.
If a host DC were willing, a nonresident's DC tax return could be
made available to the Philippines. Such an arrangement could be made as
part of a tax treaty, although it would exceed the current practice of the
United States and other DCs. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 41-43.
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some nonresidents simply ignored BIR requests for supple-
mentary information and documentation. 44
Third, the BIR had difficulty collecting taxes due.4 5 If
the BIR knew of any assets held by nonresidents within the
Philippines, it could seize and liquidate them. Otherwise,
the BIR was unable to compel payment through normal at-
tachment or garnishment procedures.
Some of these problems also blunted one of the BIR's
primary tools for dealing with recalcitrant taxpayers-the tax
clearance certificate. 46 This certificate, issued by the BIR, is
evidence that a taxpayer has no outstanding tax liabilities or
delinquencies. 47 A citizen is prohibited from leaving the
Philippines without obtaining a tax clearance certificate, and
diplomatic and consular officers have the power to refuse to
issue or to renew Philippine passports unless the applicant
presents such a certificate.48
The tax clearance certificate was ineffective for dealing
with certain delinquent nonresident taxpayers. First, non-
44. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila Uuly, 1980).
45. Id. See generally Surr, supra note 33, at 219 (discussion of the prob-
lem of collecting taxes from persons outside the country).
46. See 72 PHIL. ANN. LAWS § 346 (1956).
47. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. V-32, 49 Off. Gaz. 443
(Feb., 1953), amended by 72 PHIL. ANN. LAws § 346 (1956).
48. This power apparently is discretionary. Discussions with officials
of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980). See also Passport Regulations, reprinted in
3 PHIL. ANN. LAWS § 22 (1956).
At one time, the IRS also attempted to identify nonresident citizens
who did not file returns when they sought to renew their passports. In the
mid-1960s, the IRS, in cooperation with the Department of State, re-
quested U.S. citizens living abroad to complete IRS Form 3966 (Internal
Revenue Service Identification of U.S. Citizen Residing Abroad) when
they renewed their passports. The form set forth the tax obligations of
nonresident U.S. citizens and provided information on the availability of
IRS taxpayer assistance abroad. The form requested information con-
cerning the taxpayer's occupation and when and where he or she Liast filed
a federal income tax return. In general, the IRS's only source of informa-
tion on nonresident citizens was Form 3966.
The IRS hoped that Form 3966 and the publicity surrounding it
would encourage voluntary compliance abroad. The IRS experience was
disappointing, however, primarily because there was no legal duty to file
the form. A nonresident citizen was not preduded from renewing his or
her passport if the form was not filed. Also, taxpayers complained that the
form violated their privacy rights. As a result, in 1979, the IRS discontin-
ued the use of Form 3966. See Finch Statement, supra note 16 at 9-10.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
19851
INTERNATIONAL LA W AND POLITICS
residents who did not renew their passports, did not return
to the Philippines, or returned but did not leave afterwards
had no reason to apply for certificates. Second, some non-
residents became citizens of other countries and returned to
the Philippines under foreign passports. As "tourists" in the
Philippines, they were not required to obtain tax clearance
certificates before departing (even for those years in which
they were Filipino citizens), provided they had not "engaged
in commerce." 49
The system of tax clearance certificates had a third weak-
ness that reduced its effectiveness in the case of taxpayers
abroad. Certain nonresidents filed returns that stated an in-
correct amount of income, paid the tax owed on that
amount, and therefore had no outstanding liability or delin-
quency. Unless the BIR had reason to suspect that the in-
come reported on the return had been understated, it
routinely issued a tax clearance certificate.5 0 In some cases,
nonresidents visiting the Philippines and anticipating a chal-
lenge by the BIR brought specially prepared documentation
with them which purported to corroborate their tax re-
turns. 51
Even when the BIR uncovered cases of nonfiling by non-
residents through the tax clearance certificate requirements,
special problems still confronted the agency.5 2 The absence
of a tax return might become apparent when a nonresident's
records were reviewed for outstanding liabilities and delin-
quencies, but the problem of determining tax liability re-
mained. Some nonresidents would claim that they had no
taxable incomes because they were unemployed, retired, or
being supported by friends or relatives. Lacking an easy and
inexpensive way of investigating the taxpaying status of these
nonresidents, the BIR reluctantly accepted their explana-
tions and usually issued the certificates requested.53
Because of the weaknesses in the system of tax clearance
certificates, many embassies and consulates were less than
49. See 72 PHIL. ANN. LAws § 346 (1956).
50. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. If a nonresident claimed he or she was being supported by others
and thus had no taxable income, the BIR occasionally required an affidavit
to that effect from the person providing the support. Id.
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vigilant in requiring nonresidents to produce such a certifi-
cate before renewing their passports. - 4 Furthermore, some
embassy and consular personnel felt that the strict enforce-
ment of the tax clearance requirement might be counter-
productive in the case of an emigrant who had applied for
DC citizenship. The tax clearance certificate system may
have induced these emigrants to postpone travel to the Phil-
ippines until they had obtained new citizenship and new
passports, which made it unnecessary for them to obtain a
certificate and renew their Philippine passports. As a result,
the Philippines not only failed to collect delinquent taxes,
but also forfeited the revenue and foreign exchange which
would have been generated by their visits.55 Thus, rigorous
enforcement of the tax clearance certificate system may have
provided emigrants with an additional inducement to obtain
DC citizenship.
In order to respond effectively to the administrative
problems posed by nonresident citizens, the BIR would have
needed the assistance of the host DCs. The tax administra-
tions of the host countries might already have had informa-
tion in their files on the income of Filipino taxpayers. Even if
they did not, they could have conducted the necessary inves-
tigations. 56 In addition, the host DCs had jurisdiction not
only over resident Filipinos, but also over their assets in the
DCs. This authority could have facilitated a solution to the
BIR's collection problems.
Most DCs, however, offered a limited amount of cooper-
ation in assessing and collecting foreign taxes. The degree
of assistance needed by the BIR greatly exceeded that avail-
54. Id
55. Between September 1, 1973 and July 1, 1974, 59,534 overseas
Filipinos visited the Philippines spending an average of $500 each. Letter
of Instruction No. 210 (1974). Assuming an average exchange rate of 7.4
pesos to $1, each person spent an average of 3,700 pesos. By comparison,
for 1972 the tax collected per return under the 1-2-3 system, see infra text
accompanying notes 79-98, averaged 329 pesos. The 1974 average was 171
pesos. See infra text and Table 1 accompanying notes 98-108.
56. If the BIR had provided the names of Filipinos living in the host
DC, the DC tax administration would have been able to check its files to
see if a DC tax return had been filed. Information from this tax return
could have been given to the BIR. But DC tax administrations would not
have been in a position to help the BIR identify Filipinos who did not file
Philippine tax returns. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2. at 56.
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able through normal DC practices, 57 and the BIR rarely ap-
proached the host DCs for additional help. Access to DC
courts was also unavailable.58
The widespread lack of compliance by nonresidents, in-
cluding their failure to file returns, is evidence of the admin-
istrative difficulties that confronted the BIR in attempting to
follow the U.S. model of citizenship jurisdiction. The ex-
isting data do not provide a firm basis for evaluating the ex-
tent of noncompliance during this period. All BIR officials
interviewed, however, felt that taxpayer noncompliance was
rampant, especially among transient nonresidents.5 9 The of-
ficials distinguished between emigrant nonresidents and
transient nonresidents, such as contract workers, seamen,
and other unskilled and semi-skilled Filipinos who con-
tracted to work abroad for a specific period of time. The mi-
gration of these emigrant nonresidents constitutes the so-
called muscle drain, rather than the brain drain. 60
Tax officials believed that emigrant nonresidents had a
57. Most DCs will not furnish tax information or collect foreign taxes
except under limited and specific conditions delineated in a tax treaty. A
typical tax treaty, however, is unlikely to provide a mechanism for dealing
with the problems encountered by the BIR. The amount of information
exchanged under a tax treaty is limited, and commonly does not involve
areas relevant to the enforcement of a tax on nonresidents. Assistance in
collection of foreign taxes is even more limited. Id. at 41-43.
The current tax treaty between the Philippines and the United States
does not commit the United States to cooperate in the collection of Philip-
pine taxes on nonresidents. U.S. cooperation is limited to situations in
which Filipinos wrongfully seek to obtain treaty benefits and would not
cover nonresidents who refused to pay Philippine taxes. See Assistance in
Collection, 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 6630 (1970).
The United States receives tax information from 17 of the 34 coun-
tries with which it has a tax treaty. In general, the information pertains to
investment income, such as data on interest and dividends, and not to data
on wages and income earned through the performance of personal serv-
ices. About one-third of the information returns that the United States
receives as a result of these treaties are incomplete or are received too late
to be of use. See Finch Statement, supra note 16 at 10-12.
58. Courts in the United States, Canada, and England generally do
not recognize foreign tax judgments. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at
41 n.140.
59. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
60. See Ecevit & Zachariah, International Labor Migration, 15 FIN. & DEV.
32 (1978); H. SINGER & J. ANSARI, RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES 222-24
(1977).
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higher rate of noncompliance than transient nonresidents. 6'
In some instances, noncompliance may have been uninten-
tional because emigrants may have been unaware that their
Philippine tax obligations continued even after moving
abroad. In other cases, noncompliance may have been delib-
erate. Those who left the Philippines for political reasons
may have refused to pay Philippine taxes. Those who left
because of a lack of professional opportunities may have also
resented any obligation to pay. The longer emigrants stayed
abroad, the more they may have questioned the right of the
Philippines, rather than the right of the host DC, to tax their
incomes. Also, physical distance from the Philippines could
have bred a sense of security that encouraged emigrants to
disregard their Philippine tax obligations. Emigrants would
have easily justified their noncompliance if they considered
their Philippine tax burden onerous or excessive. Finally,
noncompliance may have been encouraged by the BIR's in-
ability to discover and punish emigrants' noncompliance.6 °2
In contrast to emigrants, transient nonresidents usually
could be identified and the amount of their earned incomes
ascertained, since their employment often was controlled
and regulated by the Philippine government. 63 In addition,
any assets owned by transient nonresidents were usually lo-
cated in the Philippines and thus could be liquidated by the
BIR to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities. Transients also
knew that they would eventually return to the Philippines
where they would be within close reach of the BIR. Such
pressures probably induced transients to comply with their
tax obligations.
As this Section suggests, the Philippine tax regime
before 1970 clearly was unsatisfactory. After the devaluation
of the peso, the extension of the normal Philippine rate
schedule to nonresidents produced harsh tax burdens. The
BIR had difficulty policing the tax abroad, and noncompli-
ance apparently was widespread. Complaints voiced both by
taxpayers and by the BIR led to changes in 1970.
61. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
62. Id.
63. The number of transient nonresidents was small until 1975 or
1976. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
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B. 1970 and 1971
In 1970, the Philippine tax law was changed to distin-
guish between nonresident and resident citizens. Nonresi-
dent citizens were allowed three special deductions that were
not available to residents. 64 In addition, the rules governing
the credit for foreign taxes were liberalized. 65 Each of these
changes was intended to alleviate special hardships suffered
by nonresident citizens66 and to increase compliance.
The first of the new deductions directly responded to
the complaint that the Philippine tax law was too restrictive
in that it did not allow nonresidents to deduct certain ex-
penditures incurred abroad. 67 Nonresidents were now al-
lowed to deduct on their Philippine tax returns those
expenditures which were deductible in the country where
they earned their income. 68 The second change introduced
a deduction for transportation expenses incurred in ob-
taining employment abroad.69 Lastly, nonresident citizens
were allowed to deduct their housing costs, either in the
amount of rent actually paid or the fair rental value of an
owner-occupied residence. 70
In addition, the scope of the foreign tax credit was
broadened. Nonresidents were allowed to credit not only
the income taxes they paid to a foreign country, but also the
income taxes paid to the state, county, or city in which they
earned their income. 71
These new deductions and the expansion of the credit
did not mollify the overseas community. Nonresidents com-
plained that even after these changes, a modest foreign in-
come, when converted into pesos, could still generate a large
64. See Bureau of Internal Revenue, Mem. Cir. No. 40-71.
65. Id. § 3.
66. Id.
67. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
68. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Mem. Cir. No. 40-71, § 1.
69. Id. § 2. The deduction also applied to transportation expenses
incurred in moving from one country to another. Id.
70. Id. § 3.
71. Id. The deduction for foreign taxes also was expanded to include
city, county, and state income taxes, but most taxpayers presumably would
have still chosen the credit rather than the deduction. See supra text ac-
companying note 27.
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Philippine tax liability.72 Apparently, none of the 1970
changes was generous enough to offset completely the ef-
fects of allowing the peso to float.73
The 1970 changes not only failed to satisfy the overseas
community, but also aggravated the verification and enforce-
ment problems of the BIR. The Bureau now faced two new
problems. First, it had to verify deductions allowable under
unfamiliar foreign tax laws. The BIR attempted to solve this
problem by requiring nonresidents to attach copies of their
foreign tax returns to their Philippine tax returns.74 Nonres-
idents routinely frustrated this approach, however, by sub-
mitting copies of bogus foreign returns.75
An ambiguity in the Philippine tax law further com-
pounded the difficulties of the BIR. The statute was unclear
about whether a nonresident could claim the same deduction
twice: once under Philippine tax law and a second time
under foreign law. 76 The BIR took the reasonable position
that a double deduction for the same expenditure was not
permitted. But it was not always obvious from a nonresi-
dent's return whether the same expenses were being de-
ducted twice.77
The BIR's second new problem involved the near im-
72. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
73. For an illustration of the problem caused by the floating of the
peso, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
74. See Bureau of Internal Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. 9-73, § 3(D).
75. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila Uuly, 1980).
76. The law stated:
All allowable deductions contained in the income tax returns filed in
the country where [the taxpayers] earn their income [shall be allowed
as deductions on the Philippine income tax returns]. Such deductions
will be allowed. . in addition to the deductions allowed under the
Income Tax Law of the Republic of the Philippines.
See Bureau of Internal Revenue, Mem. Cir. No. 40-71, § 1.
The BIR interpreted the language "in addition to the deductions al-
lowed under the Income Tax Law of the Republic of the Philippines" as
intending to clarify that foreign tax law did not displace Philippine law.
Hence, a nonresident did not lose any deductions available under Philip-
pine tax law that were not allowed under foreign tax law. According to he
BIR, the language was not intended to allow taxpayers to deduct the same
item twice. Discussion with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
77. For example, expenses identified or labeled in one manner on the
Philippine tax return might be categorized differently on the DC tax re-
turn. Id.
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possibility of verifying a nonresident's housing costs. Ten-
ants could easily manufacture bogus rental receipts, and
homeowners could exaggerate the fair rental value of their
home, in order to increase their deductions. Consequently,
the 1970 changes did little to eliminate the source of the
problems that both taxpayers and the BIR were experienc-
ing. 78
C. 1972 to the Present
Because of the general dissatisfaction of both the BIR
and Philippine taxpayers with the pre-1972 regime,79 the
taxation of nonresidents was overhauled in 1972. Under the
new scheme, which is still in effect, nonresident citizens are
taxed under a special rate schedule. These rates are: 1 % on
the first $6,000 of adjusted gross income, 80 2% on amounts
exceeding $6,000 but not over $20,000, and 3% on amounts
exceeding $20,000.81 Because of these rates, the tax regime
is known as the "1-2-3 system."
Since 1973, nonresident citizens have been allowed two
deductions: a personal exemption of $2,000 for a single tax-
payer or $4,000 for a married taxpayer or a head of house-
hold, and a deduction-but not a credit-for income taxes
paid to the foreign country where the taxpayer resides or for
income taxes paid to the foreign country where the income
was derived. 82 The 1-2-3 system is tied to the U.S. dollar:
the deductions and the brackets of the rate schedule are all
stated in U.S. dollars, and nonresidents are required to re-
port their incomes in U.S. dollars.8 3
Only Philippine citizens who qualify as nonresidents are
subject to the 1-2-3 system. From 1972 to 1978, a citizen
had to be physically abroad for an uninterrupted period that
78. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
79. Id.
80. Adjusted gross income is equal to gross income less the personal
exemption and deduction for income taxes paid to the foreign country
where the income was earned.
81. Presidential Decree No. 69 (1972). The 1972 changes apply only
to foreign income received by nonresident citizens. Income received from
domestic sources is taxable under the same rules that apply to resident
taxpayers.
82. Presidental Decree No. 323 (1973).
83. See Presidential Decrees Nos. 69 (1972), 323 (1973).
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included an entire year in order to qualify as a nonresident.8"
The requirement that the period abroad be uninterrupted
was not interpreted literally, however; home visits by a tax-
payer employed abroad on a regular basis did not interrupt
the required period.8 5 The definition of a nonresident was
broadened in 1978.86
The 1-2-3 system was designed to mitigate the problems
that had plagued the earlier approaches.8 7 First, by allowing
almost no deductions, the Philippines tried to eliminate the
BIR's administrative problems of auditing a wide range of
expenditures. Second, the country kept its tax rates low in
order to compensate for the small number of deductions and
to induce taxpayer compliance.88 Third, the Philippines in-
tended the multiple rates, in combination with the personal
exemption, to achieve a modest degree of progressivity.
Fourth, the country provided a deduction for foreign taxes in
order to alleviate the burden of multiple taxation.8 9 Finally,
by tying the tax system to the U.S. dollar, the Philippines
hoped to avoid the pre-1972 problems caused by the floating
of the peso.90
84. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. 9-73.
85. Id.
86. See infra note 117.
87. Discussion with officials of the BIR in Manila July, 1980).
88. To illustrate the modest burden imposed by the Philippine tax,
consider an unmarried taxpayer with $29,800 of salary income who lives
and works in the United States. In 1983, assuming the taxpayer did not
claim any itemized deductions, his or her U.S. income tax is $6,045. For
purposes of the 1-2-3 tax, the adjusted gross income is $21,755 ($29,800
less a $2,000 personal exemption and less the U.S. tax of $6,045), generat-
ing a Philippine tax of $375 (1% of $6000 plus 2% of $15,755). Put dif-
ferently, this taxpayer experiences a 6% increase in income tax burden
($375 divided by $6,045).
89. Because the rates of tax (1%, 2%, 37) are so low, a nonresident's
foreign income taxes typically will exceed the Philippine tax. If the Philip-
pines had continued its prior practice of allowing a credit for foreign
taxes, see supra text accompanying notes 26-27, the Philippine tax would
have been eliminated for most nonresidents.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. Nonresident citizens re-
ceiving income in a currency other than the U.S. dollar must convert such
income into dollars. The conversion is made at the average annual rate of
exchange of the foreign currency and the U.S. dollar. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. 9-73, § 4(A)(1). Theoretically, the pre-1972
problem can still affect nonresidents receiving income in currencies
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Although the tax imposed by the 1-2-3 system is in effect
a tax on gross income, many of the policy makers viewed the
system at the time of its inception as a proxy for a tax on net
income.9 ' A tax on gross income can serve as a proxy for a
tax on net income if either of two conditions is satisfied.
First, if the available deductions are a very small percentage
of gross income for all taxpayers, the tax is almost a tax on
net income. Second, even if the available deductions are not
a very small percentage of gross income, but constitute
nearly the same percentage of gross income for all taxpayers,
then any set of tax rates that might be applied to net income
can be translated into an equivalent, and lower, set of tax
rates that could be applied to gross income.9 2
In 1972, BIR officials assumed that most nonresidents
were employees, and that deductions denied under the 1-2-3
system constituted either a small percentage of gross in-
come, or the same percentage of gross income, for most
nonresidents.93 Policy makers viewed the 1-2-3 approach as
being roughly equivalent to a net income tax having none of
the administrative problems caused by the need to scrutinize
a panoply of deductions.9 4
Although the 1-2-3 system eliminated the need to audit
a vast array of deductions, the BIR must still verify each non-
resident's gross income and the amount of foreign taxes
paid. While the BIR requires nonresidents to submit copies
of their foreign tax returns and evidence of payment of for-
eign taxes, 95 it suspects that it continues to receive copies of
bogus tax returns.9 6 Moreover, many nonresidents fail to
submit any documentation at all. As one official stated: "If
they fail to submit proof of their foreign taxes, we could deny
them a deduction for their foreign taxes and increase their
stronger than the U.S. dollar. The low rates of Philippine tax, however,
greatly reduce the severity of this problem.
91. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila Uuly, 1980).
92. For example, assume that deductions constitute 20% of gross in-
come for all taxpayers. Any rate of tax [r] levied on net income can be
translated into an equivalent rate of tax [.80r] levied on gross income.
93. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
94. Id.
95. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. 9-73, § 3(D).
96. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980). See
supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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tax liability. But, so what? We wouldn't be able to collect
the increased taxes anyway." 97 This comment nicely cap-
tures the passivity and frustration that mark the BIR's admin-
istration of the 1-2-3 system. Most of the administrative
problems that characterized the pre-1972 tax regimes con-
tinue to plague the BIR. Because the BIR still lacks any ef-
fective means of collecting delinquent taxes, it makes few
attempts either to identify nonfilers or to conduct audits.
The extent of noncompliance by nonresidents is difficult
to evaluate. Data regarding the 1-2-3 system are presented
in Table I, which summarizes the number of returns filed by
nonresident citizens and the amounts of revenue collected
during the period from 1973 to 1982. Data were not avail-
able for 1972, the first year of the system.98 For purposes of
comparison, data for 1971, the last year of the old system,
are also included.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF RETURNS AND REVENUE COLLECTED
FROM NONRESIDENT CITIZENS
Increase Increase
(Decrease) Revenue (Decrease)
Calendar Number of Over Collected Over
Year Returns Prior Year (Mill. of Pesos) Prior Year
1982 184,053 23% 44.2 53%
1981 149,172 20% 28.9 24%
1980 119,338 42% 22.0 12%
1979 83,543 17% 19.5 20%
1978 71,625 24% 16.2 100%
1977 57,791 7% 8.1 1%
1976 54,055 29% 8.0 (29%)
1975 41,755 49% 11.3 135%
97. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980). The
BIR has never charged a nonresident with evasion of the 1-2-3 tax. The
small amounts of tax involved in most cases and the difficulty of enforcing
a conviction make it futile to pursue such cases.
98. The BIR's Office of International Operations, which administers
the 1-2-3 system, was created in 1973. The collection of data prior to the
creation of this office was somewhat erratic. Events leading up to the dec-
laration of martial law in 1972 interfered with the orderly processes of the
government and inade data collection difficult.
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Increase Increase
(Decrease) Revenue (Decrease)
Calendar Number of Over Collected Over
Year Returns Prior Year (Mill. of Pesos) Prior Year
1974 27,956 (13%7) 4.8 (55%)
1973 32,170 - 10.6 -
1972 N/A - N/A
1971 13,000 - .342
Source: Data for 1971-1979 were compiled by the author from the
records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Data for 1980,
1981, and 1982 were provided to Professor Bhagwati by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
One technique for evaluating the success of the Philip-
pines in administering the 1-2-3 system, and the degree of
voluntary compliance, is to compare the total amount of in-
come actually reported on tax declarations with
macroeconomic data on the amount of income that would
have been reported had there been full compliance by all
nonresident citizens. 99 In the domestic situation, an esti-
mate of the amount of income that would be reported if tax-
payers complied fully can be based on national income data,
which often is assembled by government economists and
statisticians. Data on national income in the Philippines is
irrelevant, however, in estimating the amount of income that
should be reported under the 1-2-3 system because the rele-
vant taxpayers are abroad. Instead, one needs an estimate of
the amount of income earned abroad by nonresidents. Be-
cause no government agency has made this estimate, 10 0 no
comparison can be made between the total amount of in-
come reported under the 1-2-3 system and the amount of
income that should have been reported.
Another technique for measuring noncompliance is to
compare the number of taxpayers filing returns with an esti-
mate of the number of taxpayers who should have filed re-
99. See READINGS ON INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 17, at
432; Groves, Empirical Studies of Income-Tax Compliance, 11 NAT'L TAxJ. 291
(1958).
100. Discussions with officials of the BIR and the Central Bank in Ma-
nila (July, 1980).
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turns. 1° 1 The BIR has estimated that the number of
nonresident citizens taxable under the 1-2-3 system was
800,000 in the late 1970s.10 2 For 1979, the year during the
period of the estimate in which the most returns were re-
ceived, less than 11% of the estimated taxpaying population
filed. BIR officials were not surprised by this low rate of fil-
ing; it simply reaffirmed their suspicion that noncompliance
was pervasive among nonresident citizens.
Unless the BIR's estimate of the number of returns that
should be filed under the 1-2-3 system is grossly inaccurate,
a more rigorous analysis of the data in Table I probably
would not produce results contradicting the BIR's conclu-
sion of widespread tax evasion. Nevertheless, a detailed
analysis could be useful for other purposes, such as compar-
ing the degree of compliance between emigrants and tran-
sient nonresidents, between employees and self-employed
nonresidents, and among the members of each group.
A rigorous analysis is hindered, however, by a number
of weaknesses in the data. First, not all of the tax collections
shown in Table I are attributable to the 1-2-3 system. In the
101. See Harris, Underground Economy: What Can and Should be Done:
The Federal Role, 73 NAT'L TAX A.-TAx INST. OF Aht. 262, 262-63 (1980).
102. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila Uuly, 1980). This
estimate is based on information provided by Philippine embassies and
consulates. Another estimate, not made by the BIR, places the number of
Filipino workers and seamen abroad at 705,000. Although it is unclear,
this estimate is evidently for 1974. See Case Studies in Reverse Transfer,
supra note 2, at 20 n.28 (citing M. Abella, Export of Filipino Labor in Rela-
tion to Development (updated paper)). On the basis of this estimate, the
BIR received returns in 1974 from approximately 47 of the taxpaying
population. The estimate of 705,000 may be too high, however, because
not all of these workers necessarily would qualify as nonresidents for pur-
poses of the 1-2-3 tax. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 and infra
note 117.
The Office of Emigrant Affairs estimates that as of December, 1979,
the total number of overseas Filipinos was 1,674,722. OFFICE OF Esit-
GRANT AFFAIRS, PHILIPPINES MINISTRY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, A Si'E-
CIAL REPORT ON PROFILE OF FILIPINOS OVERSEAS 2 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as OFFICE OF EMIGRANT AFFAIRS]. This figure, however, cannot be
used for estimating the number of potential taxpayers under the 1-2-3 sys-
tem because it is based solely on outflows and is not adjusted for deaths,
changes of citizenship, or persons who return to the Philippines. This last
factor is especially important because of the large number of contract
workers only temporarily abroad. See infra note 113 and accompanying
text.
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years 1972 to 1974, the Philippines issued a series of decrees
granting amnesty for tax evasion on income realized before
1972 and 1973.103 The BIR data used to generate Table I
aggregated all taxes collected from nonresident citizens,
whether attributable to the amnesties or to the 1-2-3 system.
The effects of the amnesties cannot be isolated. Drawing any
meaningful inferences about the success of the 1-2-3 system
is therefore difficult.10 4
A second obstacle results from the government's
"Balikbayan" program, which was established to encourage
Filipinos overseas to visit the Philippines. 0 5 This program
appears to have at least two objectives: first, to obtain scarce
foreign exchange and, second, to demonstrate the progress
that has been made in the Philippines in order to encourage
expatriates to return permanently.' 0 6 As part of this pro-
gram, the use of tax clearance certificates was suspended in
1973.107 The impact of these changes on the data presented
in Table I is unclear. 10 8
Third, the data do not reveal how the operation of the 1-
103. See Presidential Decrees Nos. 23 (1972), 67 (1972), 68 (1972),
156 (1973), 157 (1973), 161 (1973), 370 (1974), 563 (1974), 631 (1975).
104. For example, the large increase in filers and tax revenue from
1971 (the last year under the prior tax regime) to 1973 (the first year for
which data are available under the 1-2-3 system) supports a conclusion
that the 1-2-3 system successfully increased taxpayer compliance. This
conclusion would be erroneous, however, if the increase in filers and in
revenue were attributable to nonresident citizens availing themselves of
the tax amnesty. An additional complication arises from the increase in
emigration that evidently occurred during this period, which would also
explain the increase in filers and revenue collected. See Case Studies in
Reverse Transfer, supra note 2, at 3. Measuring the increase in emigration
is difficult because reliable data have been kept only since 1975. Discus-
sions with officials of the Ministry of Labor in Manila (July, 1980). Analy-
sis of the data in Table I is hindered further by the declaration of a new
amnesty in early 1973 which applied to acts of tax evasion regarding in-
come realized prior to 1973. See Presidential Decrees Nos. 157 (1973),
370 (1974), 563 (1974), 631 (1975).
105. See Letter of Instruction No. 105 (1973).
106. A possible third objective is to grant a certain degree of legiti-
macy to the Marcos government by persuading nonresidents to return
home, if only for a visit.
107. See Letters of Instruction Nos. 105 (1973), 163 (1974), 210
(1974); Presidential Decrees Nos. 439 (1974), 592 (1974), 819 (1975).
108. If tax clearance certificates were previously effective in encour-
aging taxpayer compliance, their suspension would be expected to result
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2-3 system has been affected by two important changes in the
nonresident community. Both the numbers of self-employed
Filipinos and contract workers abroad have increased. The
first increase challenges the assumptions made when the 1-2-
3 system was instituted that the overseas community con-
sisted primarily of employees and that a tax on gross income
was an adequate proxy for a tax on net income.
Although statistics are not available, BIR officials famil-
iar with the overseas community believe that the number of
self-employed Filipinos, such as doctors, engineers,
restauranteurs, and importers is growing.'0 9 According to
the BIR, self-employed nonresidents regard the 1-2-3 system
as unfair because it does not allow deductions for the costs
of doing business such as wages, rent, depreciation, advertis-
ing, materials, and supplies. In some cases, these costs con-
stitute a significant percentage of gross income. The impact
of the low 1%, 2%, or 3% rate of tax can therefore be sub-
stantial. 110 The BIR acknowledges that it receives few re-
in some loss of tax revenue and a reduction in the number of returns filed.
The data for 1974 are consistent with this explanation.
Alternatively, if tax clearance certificates were never very effective, the
1974 data also could be explained as a return to more normal levels of
taxpayer compliance after the increase in 1973 attributable to a tax am-
nesty. See supra note 104. Without disaggregaing the data, it is difficult to
reach a conclusion.
The 1974 dedine in filers and revenue also would be explained if a
large number of nonresidents decided to return to the Philippines and
thus were no longer subject to the 1-2-3 system. Because no data are com-
piled on inflows of nonresidents, this hypothesis cannot be tested. Any
inflow of nonresidents, however, would be offset by the sharp increase in
emigration which occurred in 1973 and 1974. See Case Studies in Reverse
Transfer, supra note 2, at 3.
109. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
110. For example, assume that a self-employed nonresident has gross
income of $100 and business expenses of $90. Ignoring the personal ex-
emption and the deduction for foreign taxes, a 3% marginal tax rate on
the nonresident's gross income oS 100 produces a tax of $3. This equals
a 30% marginal tax rate on his or her net income of $10.
To the extent that the business deductions denied to self-employed
persons represent a larger percentage of their gross income than do the
business deductions denied employees, self-employed persons are effec-
tively taxed on their net incomes at rates greater than those imposed on
employees. For example, assume that in the preceding hypothetical, an
employee had $100 of gross income and deductions of$ 10. A 37 margi-
nal tax rate on the employee's gross income of $100 produces a tax of $3.
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turns from self-employed nonresidents. Apparently, the
self-employed overseas community simply ignores the tax.
The other major change in the composition of the over-
seas communitym- the increase in the number of contract
workers- can be traced to the burgeoning demands for un-
skilled and semi-skilled labor by the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries, which provides employment for a
large number of Filipinos. In 1974, the Philippine govern-
ment created the Overseas Employment Development Board
(OEDB), partially in response to this new overseas de-
mand."'I In the years 1975 to 1979, the OEDB placed in the
Middle East more than 40,000 of the 52,849 contract work-
ers abroad.' 12
Private employment agencies also have been active; in
1979, for example, they placed over 75,000 contract workers
abroad, the majority of them in Saudi Arabia.113 The
number of Filipino seamen working outside the Philippines
also increased through the efforts of the National Seamen's
Board. In 1979, approximately 45,000 Filipinos worked
This is equal to a 3.33% marginal tax rate on his or her net income of $90
(ignoring the personal exemption and deduction for foreign income
taxes).
Under the 1-2-3 system, uniform rates of tax on net income are not
likely to result in the case of all self-employed persons. Depending on the
nature of the activity, the costs of doing business probably vary as a per-
centage of gross income. To the extent that such costs vary, self-employed
persons are taxed on their net incomes at different rates. For example, a
self-employed businessperson with $100 of gross income and $90 of ex-
penses is taxed on net income at a marginal rate of 30%e. By comparison,
another self-employed businessperson with $100 of gross income and $10
of costs is taxed on net income at a marginal rate of 3.33%.
111. See Case Studies in Reverse Transfer, supra note 2, at 21.
112. OFFICE OF EMIGRANT AFFAIRS, supra note 102, at 11, 14.
113. Id. at 8-9. The total number of contract workers hired by these
private agencies has increased dramatically since 1976. The figures for the
1976-79 period are:
Number Increase Over Prior Year
1976 13,960
1977 26,191 88%
1978 37,340 43%
1979 75,693 103%
153,184
Id. at 10. The workers in highest demand during these years were fitters,
welders, and construction workers. Id. at 17.
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aboard foreign-bound ships."14
The percentage of the overseas community represented
by transient nonresidents has increased because the number
of emigrants from the Philippines has not increased rap-
idly1 5 while the number of contract workers and seamen has
grown dramatically.'" 6 It is unclear whether the increase in
the number of nonresident filers from the years 1975 to
1979 supports the BIR view that transient nonresidents have
a higher rate of compliance with the 1-2-3 system than
emigrants do, because statistics are not kept on the occupa-
tions of 1-2-3 taxpayers. No breakdown is available on the
number of returns received from employees, contract work-
ers, seamen, or self-employed individuals; nor are there sta-
tistics showing whether filers were emigrants or were only
temporarily outside the Philippines. It is therefore difficult
to test empirically any suspected relationship between the in-
crease in the number of transient nonresidents, the number
of returns filed by nonresidents, and the amount of revenue
collected under the 1-2-3 system.117
114. Id. at 15. The number of seamen aboard foreign-bound ships
has increased steadily since 1976. The figures for the 1976-79 period are:
Number Increase Over Prior Year
1976 28,614
1977 33,378 177%
1978 37,951 14%
1979 45,226 16%
Id. at 15.
115. The figures for the 1976-79 period are:
Increase (Decrease)
Number Over Prior Year
1976 37,690 -
1977 39,451 5%.
1978 38,345 (3)7o
1979 49,450 57%
Id. at 5.
116. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
117. The increase in the number of filers from 1975 to 1979 may sup-
port the BIR's view that transient nonresidents have a higher rate of com-
pliance with the 1-2-3 system than do emigrants. For example, in 1977,
1978, and 1979, the number of returns filed increased by more than the
percentage increase in emigrants leaving the Philippines. Compare Table I
with table in note 115. One way to test the BIR's views empirically would
be to compare with the data in Table I the number of transient nonresi-
dents who left the Philippines each year. Although detailed statistics have
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Many BIR officials thought that the large increase in the
number of transient nonresidents introduced an inequity
into the administration of the 1-2-3 system. They believed
that compliance with the 1-2-3 system by emigrants was pri-
marily voluntary. Officials thought that they could exhort,
cajole, or coax the emigrant community into recognizing its
tax obligations, but that they lacked effective tools for per-
suading recalcitrants to pay. Transient nonresidents, how-
ever, generally were believed to be paying the proper
amount of taxes.
This author's interviews with BIR officials indicated
overall support of the 1-2-3 system despite its problems.
Although these BIR officials perceived that the enforcement
of the 1-2-3 system could not be uniform, they did not rec-
ommend its elimination. Instead, they emphasized that the
revenue and foreign exchange raised by the system greatly
outweighs the system's administrative cost and any inequity
suffered by particular nonresidents. Their attitude was that
the tax revenue collected, great or small, was a windfall. 1 8
No reasonable estimate of the cost of administering the
1-2-3 system, however, was available. Since BIR officials did
not spend a significant portion of their time working on the
been kept since 1975 on the number of contract workers and seamen go-
ing abroad annually, no data exist on the number returning to the Philip-
pines each year at the expiration of their contracts. Without this data, the
net increase in transient nonresidents cannot be calculated and compared
with the increase in filers and tax revenue shown in Table I.
Estimating the number of returning contract workers from the data
on outflows is difficult because information on the length of contracts and
on the number of Filipinos who renew their contracts while abroad is not
available. A change in the definition of a nonresident further complicates
the calculations. As of 1978, contract workers are considered to be non-
residents if they are abroad for at least 183 days during the taxable year.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Rev. Reg. No. 1-79, § 2(c). This change lib-
eralized the definition of a nonresident, see supra text accompanying note
84-86, and resulted in more contract workers becoming taxable under tie
1-2-3 system. The large increase in the number of filers in 1978 probably
is explained, at least in part, by the broader definition of nonresident
rather than by an increase in migration.
118. Characterizing the revenue collected under the 1-2-3 system as a
windfall assumes that the taxes otherwise would not have been collected,
Such an assumption can be questioned in the case of contract workers,
who, for the reasons already discussed in the text, may present few compli-
ance problems.
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1-2-3 system, any estimate would require an analysis of the
officials' workday to determine how their time was actually
allocated. Administrative costs were thought to be modest
because personnel performing functions relating to the 1-2-3
system were lower-paid clerical workers who checked returns
for completeness, processed payments, and filed the com-
pleted returns. The returns of 1-2-3 taxpayers received little
nonclerical attention.
Occasionally, the BIR's nonclerical staff lectured about
the 1-2-3 system to groups who were preparing to leave the
Philippines. BIR officials sometimes were sent abroad to lec-
ture to the overseas Filipino community and to assist in the
preparation of returns. These activities appeared to be mi-
nor, however, when compared with the other responsibilities
of the BIR staff. Even personnel who were assigned to Phil-
ippine embassies or consulates as BIR attaches or represent-
atives did not devote a significant portion of their time to the
administration of the 1-2-3 system.1 19 One official summa-
rized the situation: "We don't waste much time going after
emigrants because they won't pay us anyway if they don't
want to. And contract workers pay us without our doing any-
thing. So running 1-2-3 is cheap." 120
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE
The present study identifies the serious problems en-
countered by the Philippines in asserting citizenship jurisdic-
tion over nonresident Filipinos. The Philippine experience
validates, to a great degree, problems that had been antici-
pated in earlier theoretical literature' 2 ' and suggests that
other LDCs may face similar difficulties if they wish to adopt
Professor Bhagwati's proposed tax on nonresident citizens.
This study identifies two major groups of issues that an
LDC must address if it seeks to implement an effective in-
come tax for nonresident citizens. First, the country must
119. In addition to assisting nonresident citizens in the filing of their
returns, the revenue attach6 or representative disseminates information
on the tax aspects of foreign trade and investment in the Philippines and
assists foreign corporations and nonresident aliens engaged in business in
Philippines. Discussions with officials of the BIR in Manila (July, 1980).
120. Id.
121. Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 39-43.
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develop rules or principles for defining items of income and
deductible expenses, and a rate schedule appropriate for
nonresidents. Second, it must develop administrative capa-
bilities and resources needed to enforce a tax on its nonresi-
dents, both emigrant and transient.
A. Designing a Tax for Nonresidents
The experience of the Philippines demonstrates that an
LDC's domestic tax system may prove inadequate when ex-
tended to nonresident citizens. If a progressive rate sched-
ule developed in the context of an LDC's cost of living,
salary levels, and distribution of income is applied to nonres-
idents living in DCs, it may generate inappropriate tax bur-
dens. The pre-1972 Philippine experience indicates that
nonresidents who earn salaries that are modest by DC stan-
dards might appear wealthy by LDC standards when their
DC incomes are converted into the LDC currency. The ex-
tension of an LDC's progressive rates to a nonresident may
therefore produce a substantial LDC tax burden that many
nonresidents may perceive as inequitable and harsh. 122
The Philippines tried to cope with these structural
problems in two very different ways. In 1970 and 1971, non-
residents were allowed special deductions not available to
122. At each income level, the effective LDC tax rate generally will
exceed the effective DC tax rate. See Hamada, Taxing the Brain Drain: A
Global Point of View, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE
NORTH-SouTH DEBATE 125, 143 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1977).
The United States has resolved the problem of designing a suitable
set of rates by providing an exemption for certain amounts of foreign
earned income. See supra note 16. For a short time, this exemption was
replaced for most taxpayers with a series of special deductions to take into
account the higher costs of living abroad. See Tax Treatment Extension
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 913, 92 Stat. 3100-06 (1978), repealed by
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 74-34 tit. I § 112(a), 95
Stat. 194 (1981). This change increased the tax burden on many persons
abroad. Because of fears that this increased tax burden was resulting in
less employment abroad for U.S. citizens, the exemption was reinstituted.
See I.R.C. § 911 (1984). See also U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT ABROAD DISCOURAGED BY U.S. IN-
COME TAX LAws, (1981); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO TE
CONGRESS: IMPACT ON TRADE OF CHANGES IN TAXATON OF U.S. CITIZENS
EMPLOYED OVERSEAS, (1978) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT ON TRADE];
Hirsch & Rodriguez, Taxation-United States Expatriates-Foreign Earned Income
Act of 1978, 19 HARV. INT'L LJ. 633 (1978).
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residents, but their income remained taxable at domestic
rates. Since 1972, nonresidents generally have been denied
all deductions available to residents, but have been taxed at
low rates. Neither of these approaches has proved com-
pletely satisfactory.
The issue of designing an LDC tax suitable for nonresi-
dents might be resolved by an approach not yet tried by the
Philippines: the use of a surtax.'2 3 Under such an approach,
an LDC would levy its tax as a percentage, perhaps 5%, of
the tax paid to the DC in which the nonresident citizen re-
sided. To calculate the LDC tax payable, a nonresident citi-
zen would compute the amount of income taxable under DC
rules, apply the DC's rate schedule, and multiply the result-
ing tax by 5%.124
The surtax approach has a number of desirable features.
First, it avoids the problem of defining a new tax base for
nonresidents. 125 Because a nonresident would be taxed on
the same amount of income by both the LDC and the DC of
residence, an LDC would avoid the problems that the Philip-
pines encountered in modifying its domestic definition of
taxable income. 126
Second, the surtax approach would allow the LDC to
benefit from the audit procedures of the DC tax administra-
tion, thus reducing the need for the LDC to conduct its own
audits. Any DC enforcement activity would benefit the LDC,
at least to the extent that it determined the nonresident citi-
123. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 52-57.
124. Taxpayers residing in the United States could be required to
submit certified copies of their U.S. tax returns. See supra note 43.
125. The problem of defining a tax base for nonresidents is much less
severe for the United States. U.S. law is complex and sophisticated and
evidently can cope with business conditions elsewhere. U.S. rules on busi-
ness deductions appear to work satisfactorily when applied to situations
abroad. See generally Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2.
126. The tax system for nonresidents between 1970 and 1971 %-as
based on gross income calculated under Philippine law, and allowed non-
residents to claim deductions under both DC and Philippine tax law.
These tax laws proved difficult to interpret, see supra note 76, and the BIR
had trouble verifying deductions allowed by Philippine law. See supra text
accompanying notes 74-75. The surtax approach would eliminate these
problems because the Philippine tax would be based on the DC tax and,
other than the tax rate, would not be determined by Philippine law.
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zen's DC tax liability, upon which the LDC surtax would be
based.
Third, because the LDC surtax would be a percentage of
the DC tax, the LDC tax burden would be related to the DC
tax burden. Assuming that the DC employs a fair and equita-
ble tax rate, a modest LDC surtax would also be reasonable.
The burden of multiple taxation would be minimal, and re-
sort to special relief mechanisms would be unnecessary. 12 7
Also, the problems caused by currency conversion, which
troubled the Philippines prior to 1972, and the need to de-
sign a special rate schedule would be avoided. Demands for
progressivity would be satisfied because the surtax would re-
flect the progressive nature of the DC tax rates. 128 A disad-
vantage of the surtax approach, however, is that it cannot be
applied easily to nonresidents who are not subject to DC
taxes, such as employees of international organizations and
certain contract workers.' 29
127. For example, a 5% surtax ensures that the additional burden
arising from both the LDC and the DC taxing the same income is limited
to 5%. An alternative characterization of the 5% surtax is to view the LDC
as levying its tax at an effective rate equal to 105% of the DC effective tax
rate, with a credit provided for the DC tax.
128. If an LDC wanted to deviate from the DC rate schedule, it could
design its own rates. These rates could be a function of the DC tax. For
example, an LDC might wish to levy a 5% surtax as long as the DC tax
were less than a certain amount, but might wish to either increase or de-
crease the rate of the surtax if the DC tax were to exceed a certain amount.
This approach would allow an LDC to obtain more or less progressivity
than that reflected in the DC rate structure. Additional flexibility could be
achieved by choosing a different rate of surtax for different DCs.
129. Employees of international organizations such as the World
Bank or the United Nations usually are exempt from DC taxation on their
earned income and therefore do not necessarily compute their DC taxable
incomes. For the U.S. rules, see I.R.C. § 893 (1982). These employees
could, of course, be required to compute their income as if they were taxa-
ble under DC law, but the LDC tax administration then would be faced
with having to ensure that the employees' computations were accurate.
Contract workers raise a somewhat similar problem because they
might not be subject to an income tax. For example, several of the Middle
Eastern countries that employ contract workers, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 111-13, do not have an income tax, or exempt salaries earned by
foreigners. See INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, TAXES
AND INVESTMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST § 8.1 (1977 & Supp. 1983). Seamen
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B. Administrative Considerations
Although the surtax provides a pragmatic design for a
tax on nonresidents, it would do little to overcome the sec-
ond of the two major issues: enforcement of the tax. Volun-
tary compliance would, of course, be encouraged if
nonresidents viewed the LDC tax as reasonable or equitable
also may not be subject to a DC tax because of the limited amount of time
they spend within the jurisdiction of any foreign country.
Tax policy theorists might argue that the surtax approach has another
disadvantage: it deviates from a concept of horizontal equity. According
to this concept, two taxpayers who have the same incomes and who are
similar in all other respects should pay the same amount in income tax.
The surtax arguably violates this concept because nonresidents and resi-
dents earning the same incomes would pay different amounts in tax
(although horizontal equity would be improved by the surtax approach if
compared to the Philippines' present approach, which taxes residents on
their net income but taxes nonresidents on their gross income).
It is unclear, however, how the concept of horizontal equity should be
formulated in the international context. For example, in the domestic
context, nearly all theorists agree that a taxpayer's choice of where to live
is irrelevant in determining his or her tax liability. In most countries, two
taxpayers who have the same incomes but live in different regions never-
theless pay the same amounts in income tax. It is tempting to extrapolate
from this domestic situation and argue that a taxpayer's choice of resi-
dence abroad also should be ignored in levying an income tax, and that a
country should tax nonresidents in the same manner as it taxes its resi-
dents. The application of horizontal equity is not self-evident, however,
when taxpayers reside abroad. Nonresidents working abroad may experi-
ence an increase in their cost of living which is greater than any compara-
ble increase that they would experience domestically if they were to move
from one area of the country to another. For a short period of time, the
United States responded to these considerations by granting its nonresi-
dent citizens special deductions to offset the higher cost of living abroad,
although no similar deduction was granted to taxpayers moving from low-
cost areas within the country to high-cost areas. See Tax Treatment Exten-
sion Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 913, 92 Stat. 3100-06 (1978), re-
pealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 74-34, tit. I,
§ 112 (a), 95 Stat. 194 (1981).
Formulating a concept of horizontal equity is further complicated by
the problem of converting a nonresident's foreign income into LDC cur-
rency. Theoretically, a nonresident's income could be translated into its
"equivalent" LDC income, based on the nonresident's purchasing power
and standard of living, and this "equivalent" income could be taxed. Im-
plementing this approach obviously would be difficult. See generally Impact
on Trade, supra note 122, at 74-78; Gravelle & Keifer, U.S. Taxation of Citi-
zens Working in Other Countries: An Economic Analysis, in 3 STUDiES IN TAXA-
TION, PUBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 72 (1979).
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in amount and form. In comparison with many of the other
approaches available to an LDC, some of which are illus-
trated by the Philippine experience, the surtax approach
would be clearly preferable. Self-employed nonresidents
certainly would be treated more fairly under a surtax than
they would be under other approaches.
Yet an evaluation of the experience of the Philippines,
though based more on impressionistic than on empirical
analysis, suggests that certain nonresident citizens, especially
emigrants, may choose to ignore all LDC attempts to tax
their DC income, even at low rates. Is this behavior idiosyn-
cratic to Filipino emigrants? Numerous factors affect the
willingness of a nonresident citizen to comply with an LDC
tax: the circumstances surrounding the departure from the
LDC, the amount of loyalty felt toward the LDC of citizen-
ship, the burden of the LDC tax, and the risk that evasion of
the tax will be discovered and punished. Many commenta-
tors believe that of all of these factors, the possibility of dis-
covery and punishment is the key to voluntary
compliance. 130 The Philippine experience suggests, how-
ever, that most LDCs are unlikely to be capable of exerting
the threat of discovery and punishment in a credible manner
against emigrants.
Moreover, the experience of Mexico-the only other
LDC that taxed nonresident citizens on their income earned
abroad- appears to be similar to that of the Philippines.
130. See READINGS ON INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 17, at
483-85. See also Crockett, Common Obstacles to Effective Tax Administration in
Latin Amefica, in PROBLEMS OF TAx ADMINISTRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 10
(1965). Crockett states:
But is [widespread tax evasion in Latin America] true because the
Latin American is different by nature or training or outlook from the
more compliant publics of North America and Europe, as some cyni-
cal Latin Americans have seemed to think? I am convinced that no
such conclusion is warranted. On the contrary, I venture to assert
that if the limited enforcement powers, the operational obstacles, the
administrative handicaps that are prevalent in Latin America were
present in the countries of North America and Europe, a great decay
would begin to permeate their presently more productive tax depart-
ments, and as their publics became increasingly aware that impunity
and not penalty would follow evasion, the relatively high degree of
voluntary compliance that vigorous enforcement has slowly built up in
them over the years would gradually sink to very low levels.
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This explains in part why the foreign source income of Mexi-
can nonresidents was exempted from taxation in 1981.131
Furthermore, the growth of the untaxed underground
economy in the United States demonstrates that no country
has a monopoly on noncompliance once individuals perceive
that their risk of discovery and punishment is minimal. Re-
cent studies of the U.S. underground economy indicate that
taxpayer noncompliance increases dramatically whenever in-
come is not subject either to withholding or to a requirement
that the payor file an informational return with the IRS noti-
fying it of the amount paid.' 3 2 The noncompliance of over-
seas Filipinos is entirely consistent with this finding, because
income received by nonresident citizens from persons
abroad is not subject by the Philippines to either withholding
or informational returns. If the host DC were willing, such
an approach would be feasible, at least in theory.
If widespread noncompliance, at least among emigrants,
is likely to be the rule and not the exception, the inability of
the Philippines to respond effectively is obviously discourag-
ing for other LDCs. Stated differently, unless LDC tax ad-
ministrations can discover and punish cases of
noncompliance, such behavior will not be deterred. Admit-
tedly, the Philippines has not been overly aggressive in its
attempts to enforce its tax, and the administration of the 1-2-
3 system has been marked by passivity. This passivity, how-
ever, reflects the BIR's frustration at having few sanctions
directed at the collection of delinquent taxes from
emigrants. The BIR's resources are limited and must be
concentrated where they are most productive. Unless the
Bureau actually can collect the taxes owed, efforts directed at
identifying nonfilers or auditing. taxpayers are not produc-
tive.
The BIR's lack of aggressiveness also may reflect an un-
derlying conflict between vigorous tax collection and the
131. Interview with Juan Teran, former official, Ministry of Finance,
Mexico (Jan., 1982). The limited evidence on the noncompliance of U.S.
citizens abroad is also consistent with the experience of the Philippines
and of Mexico. See generally Finch Statement, supra note 16.
132. See Ekstrand, Factors Affecting Compliance: Focus Group and Survey
Results, in 73 NAT'l. TAx A.-TAx INST. OF AM. 253-62 (1980); Wolfe, Magni-
tude and Nature of Individual Income Tax Noncompliance, in id. at 271-77; Har-
ris, supra note 101, at 262-65.
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government's policy of encouraging nonresidents to visit the
Philippines. The dilemma was sharply focused by the now
suspended requirement that a tax clearance certificate be
presented before a passport is issued or renewed. The more
strictly this requirement was enforced the more likely it was
that certain emigrants would simply postpone trips home un-
til they had obtained their new citizenship and new DC pass-
ports. 3 3 Even before the official suspension of tax clearance
certificates as part of the Balikbayan program, some embas-
sies and consulates stopped requiring a tax clearance certifi-
cate prior to renewing or issuing a passport. Because other
LDCs usuially encourage visits by their overseas commu-
nity-if only to obtain scarce foreign exchange-this conflict
is not limited to the Philippines. 3 4
If this conflict is to be avoided, an LDC must collect its
tax in a manner that does not discourage visits home. The
quandary is that an LDC may have no other opportunities, or
leverage, to collect a tax from nonresidents who, along with
their assets, are safely beyond the reach of the LDC. Tying
the renewal or issuance of a passport to a tax clearance cer-
tificate is a potentially effective solution because it forces
nonresidents to identify themselves. 13 5 While such identifi-
133. Conceivably, former citizens could be identified at the time they
entered the Philippines for a visit and a determination could be made
whether they were nonfilers or had any outstanding tax liabilities that had
accrued during the period that they were citizens. Such an approach, even
assuming it could be implemented, could be easily thwarted. See supra text
accompanying notes 50-51.
134. Some LDCs have adopted elaborate incentives to encourage
nonresidents to return home permanently. For the incentives offered by
India, see Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India, Case
Study in Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain): A Survey of
Problems and Policies in India, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/6, at 21-23(1977). Sri Lanka is reported as having tried to implement a "return-of-
talent" scheme. See Marga Institute, Case Studies in Reverse Transfer of
Technology (Brain Drain): A Survey of Problems and Policies in Sri Lanka,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/4, at 15-22 (1977).
135. The LDC could require a tax certificate in conjunction with any
affirmative act requested by the nonresident, including the renewal of a
medical or engineering license. Venezuela uses such a system, requiring
certificates of solvency-proof of tax payment-for licenses as well as for
permission to leave the country. See C. SHOUP, J. Duc, L. FITCH, D. MAC-
DOUGALL, 0. OLDMAN & S. SURREY, THE FISCAL SYSTEM OF VENEZUELA: A
REPORT 195-96, 216-20 (1959).
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cation enables the LDC to collect its tax, it may also under-
mine the competing government interest in encouraging
trips home.
A different manifestation of the tension between rigor-
ous enforcement of the tax and the undermining of a com-
peting governmental interest is exemplified by a problem the
Philippines never confronted: renunciation of citizenship in
order to sever the jurisdictional basis upon which the LDC
levies its tax. 13 6 Most LDCs would probably not welcome
massive, tax-induced renunciations of citizenship by their
emigrants. An LDC that successfully collected its tax from
emigrants, however, could face this situation.
The likelihood of tax-induced renunciations is partially
related to the financial burden imposed by the LDC tax.
Although some emigrants might find any LDC tax offensive,
a tax that imposed only a modest burden, such as a 5% sur-
tax, would probably not provide a strong financial induce-
ment to renunciation.
The experience of the Philippines is of little value in
evaluating the probability of tax-motivated renunciations.
Nonresident Filipinos presumably had no need to renounce
their citizenship in order to avoid taxation-they could sim-
ply ignore the 1-2-3 tax with impunity. A Filipino's decision
to obtain DC citizenship would be made for reasons in-
dependent of tax consideration.
LDCs can respond to this potential problem of renunci-
ation by limiting a nonresident's tax exposure to that period
of time an emigrant normally must wait before becoming a
DC citizen. 13 7 This solution would eliminate the tax incen-
tive for nonresidents to renounce their citizenship. For
emigrants living in the United States, this approach would
136. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 31-33, 48-49.
137. Even if the renunciation of citizenship is not a serious threat, a
time limitation would be desirable for other reasons. Once individuals
have been abroad for substantial periods of time, the justice of continuing
to subject them to LDC taxation becomes questionable. Id. at 49. An
LDC tax limited in time, however, would obviously not produce as much
revenue as one imposed over a nonresident's lifetime. Moreover, sophisti-
cated nonresidents might intentionally work under a deferred compcnsa-
tion arrangement in order to reduce their incomes during the period in
which they would be subject to the LDC tax.
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limit their exposure to an LDC tax to five years, the normal
waiting period to become a U.S. citizen.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This case study questions whether Professor Bhagwati's
proposal to tax nonresident citizens can be unilaterally im-
plemented by an LDC. To be sure, generalizations based
upon the experience of only one LDC are subject to obvious
limitations. The available pool of evidence upon which to
base a judgment, however, will never be large because the
Philippines and Mexico are the only LDCs to assert citizen-
ship jurisdiction. Although a case study of the Mexican ex-
perience would be valuable, its results probably would not
contradict those of the Philippine study.1t 8 Unless the be-
havior of Filipino nonresidents is idiosyncratic, non-compli-
ance among emigrants-the group most likely to constitute
an LDC's brain drain-can be expected.
Enforcement by the LDC will require the assistance of
the host DC.13 9 A host DC can provide assistance at each
stage of the administration of the LDC tax by compiling a tax
role, assessing a nonresident's tax liability, and collecting the
amount of tax owed. The most efficient way of combating
widespread noncompliance would be for the host DC to col-
lect the tax on behalf of the LDC. 140 DC collection of an
LDC tax, however, as well as less interventionist roles, would
far exceed the current limited amount of intergovernmental
cooperation. 14 1
For an LDC tax on nonresidents to be workable, a host
DC would have to make costly and time-consuming changes
in its existing procedures. For example, although a surtax
would perhaps require fewer changes in DC practices than
would other alternatives, the changes nevertheless would
still be considerable. Initially, it might appear that a surtax
138. See supra text accompanying note 131. The limited information
on the U.S. experience is also not encouraging. See generally Finch State-
ment, supra note 16.
139. Certain draconian measures might in theory permit an LDC to
collect the tax without the host DC's assistance. Whether an LDC would
be capable of implementing highly sophisticated or intricate procedures is
highly problematic. See Pomp & Oldman, supra note 2, at 39-41.
140. See id. at 41.
141. See id. at 41-43.
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would only require a DC to add a line to its tax form. This
simplicity is superficial because collecting a surtax from se-
lect groups of DC taxpayers-nonresident citizens of an
LDC-would be equivalent in its administrative aspects to
the adoption of a new DC tax. A DC tax administration
would have to revise its tax forms and instructions; compile
special tax rolls of persons subject to the tax; design special
withholding tables and instructions; modify current payment
programs for persons not subject to withholding; expand
taxpayer education programs; respond to questions; and
handle disputes.
This brief outline indicates that DC collection of an LDC
tax, even one levied in its simplest form as a surtax, would
demand numerous changes in DC practices. These changes
would require a serious commitment on the part of a DC.142
Because of the controversy surrounding the Bhagwati propo-
sal, a DC would not be likely to make this commitment. Even
if a DC were inclined to cooperate with an LDC, it still might
not be willing to do so unless convinced that other DCs were
similarly disposed. Otherwise, a DC competing with other
countries for specific types of emigrants, such as doctors,
nurses, or engineers,143 might fear that its efforts at policing
an LDC tax would only divert immigration to those DCs not
willing to cooperate.
In addition, a DC would be unlikely to participate in the
enforcement of a tax on individuals who emigrated in order
to escape religious, political, or social oppression. A DC
might demand some guarantee that this group will be ex-
empt from the tax.144 Such an exemption, however, may be
impossible to administer fairly.145
A DC would probably require that an LDC tax impose
equitable burdens on taxpayers. An LDC tax that was levied
142. See id. at 56-57.
143. The DCs actively compete with each other for skilled immi-
grants. See id. at 12-13.
144. Even if practicable, such an exemption might not satisfy those
DCs which would refuse to cooperate with certain LDCs under any cir-
cumstances. See i at 46.
145. Perhaps the exemption could be granted, at a minimum, to refu-
gees protected by the United Nations Convention and Protocal Relating to
the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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as a modest surtax would satisfy this condition; other ver-
sions of an LDC tax might not. At the very least, a DC may
insist that an LDC tax on the LDC's nonresidents will not
deter individuals from emigrating.
Although a DC may view its assistance to the LDG as a
form of foreign aid or as a gesture of goodwill, the DC itself
is unlikely to derive any immediate benefit from such assist-
ance. Accordingly, a DC may have difficulty justifying costly
or time-consuming changes in its existing procedures or law.
If host DCs refuse to play an active role in enforcing an
LDC tax on nonresidents, supporters of the Bhagwati propo-
sal will face a serious dilemma. They can, of course, con-
tinue to encourage the LDCs to levy taxes on nonresident
citizens. At a minimum, some revenue and foreign exchange
will be generated. The tax will also serve as a moral state-
ment about the responsibility of nonresidents to their coun-
try of citizenship. Indeed, over time, if enough LDCs levy a
tax based on citizenship jurisdiction, perhaps the DCs will be
convinced to provide the necessary administrative assistance.
After a longer gestation period, the DCs might accept Pro-
fessor Bhagwati's argument that the benefits accruing from
the brain drain impose an obligation upon them to cooper-
ate with the LDCs in policing the tax.' 46
If the assistance of the DCs is not provided quickly, how-
ever, a tax on nonresident citizens may fall disproportion-
ately on transient nonresidents, such as contract workers and
seamen, who tend to be unskilled or semi-skilled workers. If
the Philippine experience is probative, the tax may be re-
duced to nothing more than a voluntary contribution by
emigrants to their country of citizenship. Unless DCs ac-
tively assist in the collection of LDC taxes, Professor
Bhagwati's proposal would become a tax on the muscle drain
rather than a tax on the brain drain, accomplishing few of its
objectives.
146. For a discussion of this argument, see Pomp & Oldman, supra
note 2, at 16-18.
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